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NOTES AND COMMENTS

must be treated as that of the deceased represented by his personal representative, with the benefits passing to whomsoever happens to be the next
of kin.
As to the effect of insurance on the maintenance of such actions,
23
the court in Rozell -v. Rozel had this to say:
Of course, that fact alone creates no right to sue where one
otherwise would not exist.... But I am unwilling to admit
that sanction to the maintenance of such an action between
brother and sister is any more of an incentive to fraud
than when a similar action was sanctioned between husband and wife, between an emancipated son and his father,
between grandmother and grandchild, between owner and
guest, or between intimate friends. No warrant is found for
any prediction that brothers and sisters will flock into the
courts on fictitious claims through mere judicial recognition
of the right of one to sue the other in personal injury cases.
Common honesty inherent in the family unit presents an effective barrier. If it should appear that there is any foundation for the suggestion, a means of protection may be found
in diligence on the part of the insurance carriers to ferret
out and expose the fictitious claims and reliance may be
placed on our courts and juries to detect and prevent a
fraud.24
The question will be raised one day in Oklahoma. When that day
comes, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma should follow the progressive
decisions it rendered in allowing suits between husband and wife for injuries to the person. Certainly, as compared to a lawsuit between unemancipated minors of the same family, there is more force to the argument that a law suit between husband and wife is contrary to public
policy and would disrupt the peace and harmony of the family unit. The
latter action has been sanctioned; the former action should be sanctioned.
William Thomas Coffman

Om. AND GAS: LmASE EXTENSION

In the recent case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Long, 406 P.2d
499 (Okla. 1965) the Oklahoma Supreme Court extended the doctrine
that production on one lease within a unit holds the other leases within
that unit after the primary term under the "thereafter" clause, to situations occurring within the primary term.
The issue before the court was whether the existence of a gas well
capable of producing gas in paying quantities on acreage included in a
2a 281 N.Y. 106,22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).

24 Id. at 257; accord, Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875
(1960) and Annor., 81 A.LR.2d 1155 (1962).
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well spacing and drilling unit created pursuant to statute' relieved lessees
of other acreage in that unit from the obligation to continue the payment
of delay rentals in order to preserve their leases in effect.
The court held that production from a well in one part of the unit
did perpetuate leases covering acreage in other parts of the unit and that
payment of delay rentals on those leases was not required to prevent their
termination. The court reached this decision by applying its reasoning in
Murphy -Y.Garfield Oil Co.2 to the effect that completion of a well capable of producing secures the lease for the remainder of the primary term
without the payment of further delay rentals, and its reasoning inLayton
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.3 to the effect that a producing well in
one part of a well spacing and drilling unit serves to extend leases on
acreage in other parts of the unit beyond the primary term under the
"thereafter" clause.
While no Oklahoma court had been faced with the precise question
presented inLong of whether completion of a producing well in another
part of the same unit would hold a lease during the remainder of the
primary term, the court in Layton had said, "Ifthe lease was extended by
production in the spacing unit, the payment or non-payment of delay
rentals could not affect the matter in anywise."4 (This was not the basic
issue before the court inLayton but was discussed by the court because
the lessor sought to show that the parties had entered into a construction
of their lease as a result of the lessee's gratuitously paying delay rentals
after the completion of the well inthe other part of the unit.)
The holding of the court in the instant case is sound and is the logical result of applying existing law in this state to the question. Also this
is the established law in other jurisdictions having similar statutes.5 For
instance in Sohio Petroleum Co. v.VS. & P.R.R.0 the lease in question
had a primary term of 10 years and provided that if a well were not
drilled within the first year, the lease would terminate unless a delay
rental were paid prior to the anniversary date of the lease. During the
first year the Commissioner of Conservation entered an order creating a
drilling unit including the leased land, and a gas well was drilled, completed and shut in.The delay rentals were not paid, and the lessors brought
an action to cancel the leases, basing their claims primarily on this failure
to pay delay rentals under the leases included in the unit but on which
the well was not located. The Louisiana court held that the failure to pay
delay rentals did not cause the leases to terminate, because a well was
drilled and completed on the unit before the delay rentals bcame payable.
The purpose for which a lessor traditionally executes an oil and gas
1 52 Okla. Stat § 87.1 (1961).
2 98 Okla. 273,225 P. 676 (1924).
3

383 P.2d 624 (Okla. 1963).
627.
6 WILLUMS AND MEYBRS, OIL

4 Id. at

AND GAS LAW § 952 (1964).
222 La. 383, 62 So.2d 615 (1953), appeal dismissed sub nom. Arender v.
Kingwood Oil Co., 346 U.S. 802 (1953).
5
6
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lease is to determine if hydrocarbons are located below the surface of his
land and, if so, to provide for the production of such hydrocarbons. It is
contemplated that drilling will begin without delay; but a provision is
generally inserted to the effect that drilling can be delayed by the payment of a delay rental in lieu of drilling. These leases are generally classified into two main groups, the "unless" type and the "or" type. The "tinless" lease typically provides that if no well is commenced within one
year the lease shall terminate as to both parties unless the lessee pays to
the lessor a delay rental. The "or" lease typically provides that the lessee
agrees to commence a well within one year or pay the lessor a delay
rental.
Where the lease is perpetuated by production--either on the leased
acreage or, as in Long, on other acreage within the unit-the purpose of
the lease is fulfilled and the delay rental provision never comes into play
if production extends beyond the primary term. Thus in Long it is not
relevant whether the delay rental provision is of the "unless" type or the
.or" type, and the court in the body of the opinion did not make any
point of the fact that they were dealing with an "unless" lease. However
there are two phrases in the opinion which, when taken out of this context could appear inaccurate; this possibility is increased by the fact that
the court in the syllabus called attention to the fact that the lease in question was an "unless" lease. These phrases are, "The Murphy case demonstrates the purpose of such drill or pay clauses as is contained in the lease
before us."7 and, 'Under an oil and gas lease by the terms of which the
lessee is obligated to either commence thedrilling of a well upon the
leased premises within one year or pay to the lessor a stipulated sum as
delay rental.. ."s (Emphasis added).
In order to resolve this portion of the court's reasoning it is essential
to note that the ultimate issue in Long is whether a delay rental was duenot the effect of having failed to make a rental payment admittedly due.
Thus these references to the obligation to drill or pay do not mean that
with an "unless" lease the lessor who has not drilled is under an obligation
to pay or be liable for suit for the amount of the payments or for breach
of contract as would be true with an "or" lease. Rather they mean with
regard to the underlying problem before the court, what the lessee is
obligated to do to perpetuate the lease during the primary term, that the
lessee is obligated to either drill or pay--not both.
The law is clearly established and is no longer open to question as
to the distinction between an "unless" and an "or" lease. 9 An "unless"
lease does not create any unqualified obligation on the part of the lessee
to either drill or pay a delay rental' 0 The lessee generally is said to have
only a determinable fee and if there is no drilling and the delay rental is
not paid in accordance with the lease, the estate automatically reverts to
7 406 P.2d at 502.
s Ibid.

9 3 WILLAMS, Onm AND GAS LAW §§ 605, 605.1, 605.2 (1964).

10 3 WLLiAMs, OIL AND GAS LAW § 606 (1964).
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